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what was japans defensive mistake in relation to the doolittle attack?

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Air raid on Japan during Globe War 2

The Bombing of Yawata on the night of 15/16 June 1944 marked the beginning of the Usa Army Air Forces (USAAF) strategic bombing campaign confronting the Japanese home islands during Earth State of war Ii and was the beginning such raid to use strategic bombers.[a] The raid was undertaken past 75 Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers staging from bases in China. Only 47 of these aircraft dropped bombs near the raid's chief target, the Regal Iron and Steel Works at Yawata in northern Kyūshū, and little harm was caused. 5 B-29s were lost in accidents during the functioning and two were destroyed by Japanese aircraft.

While the raid did not attain its aims, it raised Japanese civilians' awareness that their country was being defeated and received positive media coverage in the United states of america. Intelligence gathered by the B-29s also revealed weaknesses in Japan'southward air defenses and the raid was the first of many on Japan. Yawata was attacked again by B-29s operating from China on 20 August 1944 and much of the city was destroyed in a firebombing raid conducted past B-29s based in the Mariana Islands on viii Baronial 1945.

Groundwork [edit]

The first United States Regular army Air Forces (USAAF) raid on Japan took place on 18 April 1942 when 16 Due north American B-25 Mitchell medium bombers flight from an aircraft carrier attacked several cities during the Doolittle Raid. Although this raid caused little damage, it boosted morale in the United States. The Japanese authorities responded to the attack by both increasing the number of fighter units based in the home islands and conducting an offensive in the Pacific Ocean which ended in defeat during the Battle of Midway.[i] The USAAF could non mount farther attacks on the Japanese dwelling house islands afterwards this raid, nonetheless, as none of its combat shipping had sufficient range to attain this expanse from bases in China or the Pacific until the B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber was ready for combat.[2]

The B-29 Superfortress had a hard introduction into service. Work began on designing the bomber in early 1940, and the outset epitome flew on 21 September 1942. The Superfortress was the largest gainsay aircraft of World War 2 and boasted a heavy maximum bomb load, long range, and powerful defensive armament.[3] The B-29 also incorporated a number of new features, such as a pressurized motel and remote-controlled turrets. While one,664 B-29s had been ordered by the USAAF before the aircraft first flew, its evolution was prepare dorsum by several months when the second prototype crashed on 18 February 1943[b] and problems with the design were gradually solved.[v] The 58th Bombardment Wing was formed in June 1943 to operate the USAAF'southward first B-29s, but it did not begin receiving these aircraft until October. The irksome delivery of B-29s and mechanical problems with the aircraft meant that the wing lagged behind its training schedule and only became capable of deployment in March 1944, later the so-chosen "Battle of Kansas" program began to produce combat-gear up aircraft.[6]

In late 1943, the United states of america Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal to begin a strategic air campaign confronting the Japanese dwelling house islands and Eastward Asia past basing B-29s in India and establishing forrad airfields in areas of China. This strategy, which was designated Functioning Matterhorn, required the construction of big airstrips nigh Chengdu in inland China which would exist supplied by Allied cargo aircraft and exist used to refuel B-29s traveling from bases in Bengal en route to bombing targets in Nihon.[7] XX Bomber Command was assigned responsibility for this effort, and its ground coiffure began to leave the United States for India past ocean in Dec 1943.[viii] [9] The Twentieth Air Strength was formed in April 1944 to oversee all B-29 operations. In an unprecedented move, the commander of the USAAF, General Henry H. Arnold, took personal command of this unit and ran information technology from the Pentagon.[10] The 58th Bombardment Fly was Twenty Bomber Command's main combat unit, and its movement from Kansas to Bharat took place from Apr to mid-May.[xi] While the fly had not completed preparation at the fourth dimension that it left for Republic of india, its combat groups were more than experienced than virtually newly deployed USAAF bomber units.[12]

Preparations [edit]

The states [edit]

A black and white map of East Asia. Most of the cities depicted on the map are marked with bomb symbols.

Locations of B-29 bomber bases in China and the main targets they attacked in East Asia during Operation Matterhorn

Afterward establishing itself in India, 20 Bomber Command under the command of Brigadier General Kenneth Wolfe undertook various tasks to prepare for raids against Japan.[13] Foremost among these was stockpiling fuel at the airfields in China. Until late 1944, USAAF Air Send Command aircraft did not transport fuel for 20 Bomber Command, and this chore was instead undertaken by the B-29s. This arrangement proved inefficient, nevertheless, as 12 B-29 sorties between India and China were needed to transport plenty fuel and other supplies to enable 1 of the heavy bombers to fly a circular trip between China and Nihon.[14] Every bit a consequence, it took longer than expected to build up sufficient stockpiles in China to allow B-29 operations to commence.[15] Moreover, continued technical bug with the Superfortress, and peculiarly their Wright R-3350 engines, resulted in many of XX Bomber Command's shipping being unserviceable and in need of modification at all times.[sixteen]

XX Bomber Command conducted its kickoff combat operation on 5 June 1944. On this day, 98 B-29s were dispatched from bases in India to assault targets in Bangkok, Thailand, as a 'wearing apparel rehearsal' for more ambitious operations against Japan and targets in South East Asia. Although little damage was done and five B-29s were lost to flying accidents and technical faults, the functioning was rated a success by Xx Bomber Command, as it provided useful combat feel for the bomber crews, as well every bit data on how the B-29 performed in activeness.[17]

On half-dozen June, Wolfe received a bulletin from Arnold informing him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a raid to be conducted confronting Japan as before long as possible. The goals of this performance were to relieve pressure level on Chinese forces which were beingness attacked by the Japanese and to back up the invasion of Saipan. Arnold's bulletin also asked how many B-29s could exist dispatched on xv and 20 June. At the fourth dimension, the first raid on Japan was tentatively scheduled for 23 June, when sufficient supplies were expected to be available in China to support 100 B-29 sorties. Wolfe replied, stating that fifty B-29s could be used on 15 June and 55 if the operation was conducted on the 20th of the calendar month. Arnold regarded these numbers as as well depression and directed that a raid by at least 70 B-29s exist conducted confronting Nippon on 15 June. Following this club, XX Bomber Command's B-29s and transport aircraft embarked on an intensive endeavour to move fuel to China. Further fuel supplies were made available to the heavy bombers by reducing the activities of USAAF fighter units based in People's republic of china. During the same menstruation, the command'due south basis crews reconditioned equally many B-29s as possible to better their reliability.[18]

The target selected for the commencement raid on Nippon was the Imperial Iron and Steel Works at Yawata, an industrial metropolis about ane,600 miles (2,600 km) from Chengdu.[nineteen] This was the single near of import facility in Japan'due south steel industry, every bit it produced 24 per centum of the state's total output of rolled steel. The facility was dependent on three coke plants, and the largest of these was selected as the designated aiming bespeak for the B-29s. Nearby Laoyao harbor, which was an important industrial port, was designated equally the raid's secondary target.[twenty] The selection of Yawata'southward steelworks as the first target to be attacked was in accordance with a decision made by the Twentieth Air Force on ane April 1944, which assigned the highest priority to attacking Japan's steel and coke manufacture.[21] Information technology was decided to bear the raid at nighttime, with each B-29 bombing individually, as the aircraft lacked the range needed to acquit a more than fuel-intensive germination flight betwixt the forrard air bases and Yawata.[xx]

Japanese [edit]

Despite an elaborate charade plan, which included planted news stories claiming that B-29s would be deployed as bombers in Europe but merely be used as armed transports in the Cathay Burma Republic of india Theater, the Japanese military detected the grooming of B-29 bases in India and People's republic of china.[22] Moreover, Japanese agents in China reported on all B-29 movements, giving hours of warning time before raids on the domicile islands.[23] Japanese intelligence services deduced that one time logistical preparations were complete, the heavy bombers would assault factories in northern Kyūshū, and that the first raid would be made at night.[24] On 26 April, Japanese fighters encountered a B-29 for the first time, when two Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscars" attacked and damaged a lone B-29 flying near the China–India border.[24]

The Japanese military began transferring fighter aircraft from China and the Pacific to the abode islands in early 1944 in anticipation of B-29 raids.[25] In June 1944, Yawata lay within the Western Commune of Japan's four regional defense commands.[26] The 19th Air Brigade was formed in June 1944 to command fighter units in the Western District and comprised the fourth and 59th Air Regiments. The 4th Air Regiment was stationed at Ozuki Airfield and was equipped with 35 Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu twin-engined heavy fighters, of which 25 were operational in mid-June, and had the brigade's best-trained pilots. The inexperienced 59th Air Regiment was based at Ashiya Fukuoka Airfield and operated 25 Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien unmarried-engined fighters, though merely most seven or eight were operational.[27] [c] In add-on, Yawata and northern Kyūshū were defended by anti-shipping artillery units and barrage balloons.[29] Radar stations and a network of scout posts provided early on alarm of raids.[30]

The 19th Air Brigade'southward primary mission was to defend the industrial facilities in northern Kyūshū, and particularly the ironworks at Yawata. The brigade's plans for the defense of the Western Commune called for its interceptor aircraft to be full-bodied over Yawata and not move far from the area. While this inflexible deployment was considered unsatisfactory by the 19th Air Brigade, it was deemed necessary, every bit few aircraft were available, the merely searchlight units needed to facilitate night operations were stationed virtually Yawata and northern Kyūshū was regarded past the Army equally being the most important region in the Western District.[31] Prior to the raid on Yawata, the 19th Air Brigade undertook joint planning with anti-shipping units and implemented a preparation program which included practise in responding to alerts and night flying.[32]

Raid [edit]

The 58th Bombardment Wing's B-29s began moving from Bharat to the frontward bases in Mainland china on 13 June. By 15 June, 83 Superfortresses had reached the four forward airfields around Chengdu, though at to the lowest degree 12 turned back before reaching China, and another crashed, causing the death of its entire coiffure. Each of the shipping had departed India conveying the 2 short tons (one,800 kg) of 500-pound bombs they would use in the raid. A big number of staff officers, including eight generals, likewise traveled to Chengdu to observe the operation merely were non allowed to participate in the raid. The bomber crews were joined by eight journalists and three news photographers, however.[33] At the time, the USAAF had few recent photos of Japanese industrial areas, and the bomber crews were briefed on Yawata using maps and photos from the late 1920s and early 1930s.[34]

The Superfortresses began to depart their bases at sixteen:16 local time on 15 June.[35] The raiding strength was led past the 58th Bombardment Wing's commander, Brigadier General Laverne G. Saunders.[19] Ane aircraft crashed immediately after taking off with no casualties and a further four turned back suffering mechanical problems. The remaining lxx aircraft proceeded on a direct course to Okino Island, where they turned for the run-in to Yawata.[35] Each of the 58th Battery Wing's four groups sent 2 aircraft ahead to marking the target and the other aircraft flew in a long bomber stream; both of these tactics had been adopted from those used by the British Purple Air Force's Bomber Command in Europe.[36] The raiders were detected past Japanese Army and Army Air Strength units in China. These reports were passed onto the 19th Air Brigade, which estimated that the bombers were bound for northern Kyūshū and would make it in that location at about midnight local time. A radar station and lookout man posts on Cheju-Do subsequently detected the bombers from 23:31 to 00:30 local fourth dimension. An air raid alarm was issued at 00:24 and 24 aircraft of the 4th Air Regiment began to have off three minutes later to patrol over northern Kyūshū.[37] The 59th Air Regiment was not scrambled, as its pilots had not worked with those of the 4th Air Regiment in night operations, its shipping were suffering from mechanical problems, and it was feared that the B-29s would sight and set on the base of operations at Ashiya.[38]

B-29s began to arrive over Yawata at 00:38 local time, and the attack on the city lasted almost two hours. Only 15 of the American aircraft were able to aim their bombs visually, as the city was blacked out and obscured by fume or haze; the other 32 bombed by radar. Two further B-29s bombed Laoyao harbor and another v struck targets of opportunity; overall 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid.[39] [xl] Subsequently the outset bombs were released, regular updates on the operation were transmitted to the Twentieth Air Forcefulness'south headquarters in Washington, from where they were relayed to Arnold, who was in London at the time.[41] The raiders were met with heavy but inaccurate anti-shipping fire, and the searchlights stationed effectually Yawata were not effective.[35] The 4th Air Regiment accomplished the only kill of the dark when one of its fighters shot down a B-29. The Regiment's other aircraft struggled to make contact with the bombers and achieved few interceptions.[42]

The B-29s' return flying to China was largely uneventful. One of the Superfortresses was strafed and destroyed by Japanese aircraft after landing at Neihsiang with engine problem, and a further two aircraft crashed with the loss of their entire crews and a contributor from the magazine Newsweek.[43] [44] Overall, American losses in the raid were seven B-29s destroyed and a further six damaged past anti-aircraft guns; 57 airmen and i announcer were killed aboard these aircraft.[45] Many of the B-29s were stranded in China for several days after the raid past fuel shortages there and merely returned to Republic of india after Wolfe borrowed 15,000 Usa gallons (57,000 l) of fuel from the 312th Fighter Wing's supplies. During this period, the bombers were highly vulnerable to Japanese retaliatory raids, only none came about.[43]

Aftermath [edit]

Trivial impairment was acquired by the raid on Yawata. On 18 June, a USAAF Fourteenth Air Force aircraft overflew the city and photographed the target area. These photos showed that only a single bomb had landed within the Majestic Fe and Steel Works complex, and it had striking a powerhouse 3,700 feet (ane,100 one thousand) from the nearest coke oven. Light harm had also been inflicted on Kokura Arsenal and other industrial and civilian buildings in the area. Despite a USAAF policy of encouraging factual reporting of B-29 operations, the raid's results were overstated in the U.South. media.[46] The light combat losses suffered by the raiders and electronic intelligence collected by the B-29s revealed the ineffectiveness of Japanese radar and air defenses. As a event, the USAAF dispatched a unmarried photograph-reconnaissance B-29 to overfly much of Japan and Korea on 21 June. This sortie was successful and greatly improved U.Southward. intelligence holdings on these areas.[47]

The Yawata raid revealed serious shortcomings in Japan's air defenses. While the 19th Air Brigade initially claimed to have shot downward 8 B-29s and damaged a further four, it was soon determined that only two of the bombers had been destroyed. This loss ratio was considered too low to defeat attacks on the dwelling islands. The raid demonstrated that Japan had too few airbases and not enough shipping were bachelor for nighttime operations. Information technology was also found that the Toryu fighter was not well suited to intercepting B-29s, as it was slower than the bombers, as well lightly armed, and most shipping lacked radar. While the air raid alarm system had proved successful in this instance, the radars which detected the American aircraft had been unable to determine their altitude, and it was decided that in that location was a need to farther expand radar coverage.[48] The performance of the 131st Anti Aircraft Regiment during the raid was judged to exist then poor that its commander was transferred to Manchuria.[49] News reports of the Yawata raid and successful U.S. landing at Saipan on the same day also indicated to Japanese civilians that the state of war was not going well.[41] In response to the raid, Japanese Government ministers urged families living in the land'south four major cities to evacuate their children to rural areas.[50]

The xv/16 June 1944 raid on Yawata marked the beginning of the USAAF's strategic bombing campaign against Nihon.[51] The metropolis was struck once again by B-29s during daylight and night raids on twenty August, but no serious harm was caused.[52] 20 Bomber Command conducted 49 raids from its bases in Communist china and India between June 1944 and March 1945, of which nine were made on targets in the Japanese dwelling house islands, but Operation Matterhorn did not reach its goals. Despite initial problems, XXI Bomber Command's operations from the Mariana Islands, which began on 28 October 1944, proved much more effective. As a result, XX Bomber Control was transferred to the Mariana Islands in early 1945.[53] [54] Yawata was targeted again past B-29s on 8 August 1945, ii days afterwards the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. On this day the city was attacked by 221 B-29s, escorted by 3 groups of P-47N Thunderbolt fighters, including the 318th Fighter Group based on Ie Shima off the coast of Okinawa. The bombers were armed with incendiary bombs, and the resulting firestorm destroyed 21 pct of Yawata's urban area.[55]

See besides [edit]

  • Bombing of Yawata

Footnotes [edit]

  1. ^ The Doolittle raid of April 1942 was conducted using B-25 medium bombers
  2. ^ Described by James Cate as "[wiping] out Boeing's about experienced B-29 personnel".[4]
  3. ^ The Kawasaki Ki-45 Toryu and Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien were assigned the reporting names of 'Nick' and 'Tony' respectively past the Western Allies.[28]

Citations [edit]

  1. ^ "America Hits Back: The Doolittle Tokyo Raiders". National Museum of the US Air Force. Archived from the original on 15 June 2021. Retrieved xix Jan 2016.
  2. ^ Correll (2009), p. 62.
  3. ^ Polmar (2004), pp. 4–five.
  4. ^ Cate (1953), p. 6.
  5. ^ Cate (1953), pp. vi–8.
  6. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 52–57.
  7. ^ Correll (2009), pp. 62–63.
  8. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 75–79.
  9. ^ Tillman (2010), p. 41.
  10. ^ Tillman (2010), p. 45.
  11. ^ Tillman (2010), pp. 43–44.
  12. ^ Cate (1953), p. 57.
  13. ^ Frank (1999), p. l.
  14. ^ Correll (2009), p. 64.
  15. ^ Cate (1953), p. 98.
  16. ^ Correll (2009), p. 63.
  17. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 94–98.
  18. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 98–99.
  19. ^ a b Jablonski (1979), p. 133.
  20. ^ a b Cate (1953), p. 99.
  21. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 93–94.
  22. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 77–79.
  23. ^ Tillman (2010), pp. 44–45.
  24. ^ a b Sakaida & Takaki (2001), p. half-dozen.
  25. ^ Kerr (1991), p. 61.
  26. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 3–5, 129.
  27. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 129–130.
  28. ^ Ross (2003), p. 172.
  29. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), p. 132.
  30. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 134–136.
  31. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 131–132.
  32. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 132, 142–143.
  33. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 99–100.
  34. ^ Cate (1953), p. 164.
  35. ^ a b c Cate (1953), p. 100.
  36. ^ Tillman (2010), pp. 50–51.
  37. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 144–146.
  38. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), p. 147.
  39. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 100–101.
  40. ^ Wolf (2005), p. 298.
  41. ^ a b Cate (1953), p. 102.
  42. ^ Tillman (2010), pp. 51–52.
  43. ^ a b Cate (1953), p. 101.
  44. ^ Jablonski (1979), p. 134.
  45. ^ Tillman (2010), p. 52.
  46. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 101–103.
  47. ^ Chocolate-brown (1999), pp. 421–422.
  48. ^ Detwiler & Burdick (1980), pp. 147–149.
  49. ^ Zaloga (2010), p. 51.
  50. ^ Daniels (1981).
  51. ^ Cate (1953), p. 3.
  52. ^ Cate (1953), pp. 113–114.
  53. ^ Correll (2009), p. 65.
  54. ^ Cate (1953), p. 171.
  55. ^ Cate & Olson (1953), pp. 655–656.

References [edit]

  • Brown, Louis (1999). A Radar History of Globe State of war II: Technical and Military Imperatives. London: Institute of Physics Publishing. ISBN0-7503-0659-ix.
  • Cate, James Lea (1953). Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea (eds.). The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945 (PDF). The Army Air Forces in World State of war II. Book 5. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Printing. OCLC 9828710 – via Hyperwar Foundation.
  • Cate, James Lea; Olson, James C. (1953). "The All-Out B-29 Attack". In Craven, Wesley Frank; Cate, James Lea (eds.). The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki June 1944 to August 1945. The Army Air Forces in Globe War II. Volume 5. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. OCLC 9828710 – via Hyperwar Foundation.
  • Correll, John T. (2009). "The Matterhorn Missions". Air Strength Magazine. Arlington: The Air Strength Association (March 2009).
  • Daniels, Gordon (31 December 1981). "Before Hiroshima: The Bombing of Japan 1944–45". History Today. 32 (1). Retrieved 7 February 2011.
  • Detwiler, Donald Southward.; Burdick, Charles B., eds. (1980). "Homeland Air Defence force Operations Record (Japanese Monographs No. 157 )". Volume 12: Defence force of the Homeland and Stop of the War. War in Asia and the Pacific. New York City: Garland Publishing. ISBN0-8240-3296-ix.
  • Frank, Richard B. (1999). Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN0-14-100146-1.
  • Jablonski, Edward (1979). Airwar. Volume Four: Wings of Fire . Garden City: Doubleday & Visitor. ISBN0-385-14279-X.
  • Kerr, Eastward. Bartlett (1991). Flames Over Tokyo: The U.Due south. Army Air Forces' Incendiary Campaign Confronting Nihon 1944–1945 . New York City: Donald I. Fine Inc. ISBN1-55611-301-iii.
  • Polmar, Norman (2004). The Enola Gay: The B-29 That Dropped the Diminutive Bomb on Hiroshima. Washington, DC: Smithsonian National Air and Infinite Museum. ISBNi-57488-859-five.
  • Ross, Stewart Halsey (2003). Strategic bombing past the Usa in World War Two: The Myths and the Facts. Jefferson: McFarland. ISBN978-0-7864-1412-3.
  • Sakaida, Henry; Takaki, Kōji (2001). B-29 Hunters of the JAAF. Aviation Elite Units five. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-84176-161-9.
  • Tillman, Barrett (2010). Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942–1945 . New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN978-one-4165-8440-7.
  • Wolf, William (2005). Boeing B-29 Superfortress: The Ultimate Look: From Drawing Lath to VJ-24-hour interval. Atglen, PA: Schiffer. ISBN0-7643-2257-five.
  • Zaloga, Steven J (2010). Defence of Nippon 1945. Fortress 99. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-one-84603-687-iii.

External links [edit]

  • "B-29 Superforts Flop Japanese Mainland". Life. Time Inc. 17 (2): 78. 10 July 1944.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Yawata_(June_1944)

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